Under the market-driven acquisition theory, targets tend to be underpaid by rational acquirers. One of the reasons targets agree to the transaction is that they are short-horizon oriented. Using a sample of 770 mergers and acquisitions announced between 1993 and 2002, this study empirically shows that targets are more likely to be underpaid when they have shorter horizon-oriented shareholders and CEOs. Shareholder turnover ratio, CEO age, tenure, equity-based wealth and incentive to cash out are proxied for horizon.
Introduction
Much of the research in corporate finance has focused on the underlying motivation for mergers and acquisition. Jensen (1988) summarizes that in the long-run, takeovers generate substantial gains, which result from easier access to resources, transfer to more highly-valued use of assets, etc. The managerial hubris hypothesis posited by Roll (1986) suggests a psychological interpretation and implies that managers in bidding firms tend to overpay for the target. Agency theory focuses on the interest disparity between shareholders and executives. Grinstein and Hribar (2004) investigate the CEO compensation package, the alignment of interest between shareholders and executives and managerial incentives in mergers and acquisitions.
Recent research work tries to explain the observed merger waves and the positive correlation between market valuation and merger waves. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) establish a model of mergers and acquisitions which argues that stock market misvaluation drives acquisitions. According to this model, they posit that the long-run reason for bidders to takeover the target is the undervaluation of the target. Shareholders of the acquiring firm will gain from the acquisition if the target is undervalued to fundamentals in cash acquisitions and relatively undervalued to the bidder in stock acquisitions. Overvalued firms are more likely to be bidders and undervalued firms are more likely to be targets. Target shareholder will gain in the short-run. However, shareholders holding onto shares in an overvalued market will lose in the long-run. Therefore, target managers will protect long-horizon shareholders' interest if they resist the offer. The model predicts that bidders in stock acquisitions either have longer horizon than targets or pay personal deals to target managers to agree to the acquisition.
Rhodes- Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) propose a different model, which separates misvaluation into firm-specific component and market-wide component. The model shows that the potential market valuation deviation from fundamental values impacts merger activities. Their theory predicts that acquisitions are more likely to occur in overvalued markets. Because in the more overvalued market, the rational target managers with limited information will overestimate the firm-specific misvaluation, and thus overvalue the synergies from the acquisition. Method of payment will contain a higher fraction of stock in overvalued markets and higher fraction of cash in undervalued markets.
The follow-up empirical research provides strong support to the theory of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) . Dong et al. (2003) tests the hypotheses of misvaluation driven acquisitions. Their study employs two contemporaneous measures of misvaluation: pre-takeover ratio of book value of equity to price and pre-takeover ratio of residual income value to price. They find evidence that bidders are relatively overvalued to targets, bidders are more overvalued in stock acquisitions than in cash acquisitions, undervalued targets receive higher premium and are more likely to resist the offer, which is consistent with the predictions by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) . Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson and Viswanathan (2005) , based on the theory of Rhodes- Kropf and Viswanathan (2004) , decompose M/B into three components: firm-specific error, time-series sector error and long-run value to book to measure misvaluation. The empirical results show that acquirers and targets appear to share the common misvaluation component of time-series sector. The difference in M/B between acquirers and targets is mainly attributed to the firm-specific error. High firm-specific error is positively correlated to the possibility of being involved in a merger as an acquirer and using stock as method of payment.
Similar to Dong et al. (2003) and Rhodes-Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan (2004) , Ang and Cheng (2005) find evidence on the market-driven acquisitions theory. In addition, they also find some new results which are consistent with the critical assumption made by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) . Shareholders of acquiring firms do not suffer loss in the long-run compared to those of matching firms. However, former shareholders of target firms are the losers if they hold shares in a long-term post-merger period.
Although previous empirical research has found evidence on the misvaluation of firms and the long-run return for the market-driven acquisitions, we still lack evidence on the reason of targets to accept the acquisition offer which hurts the value of shareholders in the long-run. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) conjecture that target agrees to the acquisition because the targets have shorter horizons in the firm or the self-benefited target managers get private payment from the acquirer.
This study intends to test several empirical predictions under the market-driven acquisition theory inspired by Shleifer and Vishny (2003) . Previous literature shows that targets are undervalued compared to non-target match firms in cash acquisition and relatively undervalued compared to bidder in stock acquisition. Although bidders usually offer premium price, the premium may be not enough to compensate the undervaluation of targets in cash acquisitions and the overvaluation of bidders in stock acquisitions. It is expected that underpaid targets shareholders will lose money in the long run. Therefore, either the shareholders or the managers have short horizons in the firm. Targets with long-horizon investors and managers will be more likely to resist the offer and thus less likely to complete the acquisition.
Research Design

Main Hypotheses
Although bidders are blamed for overpayment in mergers and acquisitions, the overvaluation of bidders and undervaluation of targets is ignored. If taking the misvaluation into consideration, we may conclude that the premium provided by acquirers is not huge enough to compensate the undervaluation of target market value in a cash acquisition and the overvaluation of bidder market value in a stock acquisition.
Based on the theory of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , I develop several hypotheses for empirical test.
First, acquirers will tend to underpay targets in market-driven acquisitions, which should be found empirically. Second, if targets have shorter horizon-oriented shareholders and CEOs, they are more likely to be underpaid. Last, it is expected that firm horizon is also related to the magnitude of underpayment.
Variable Construction
Measurement of underpayment
Target value should be measured to see whether the deal value offered by acquirer is appropriate. Two principle valuation approaches are the Price to book (P/B) method and the Residual Income Model (RIM). P/B is the market-to-book ratio of the stock. 1 In the RIM based on Ohlson (1995) , firm value is current period book value of equity plus all expected future discounted earnings in excess of required return on the equity capital.
Empirically, future earnings are proxied by analyst earnings forecasts (e.g., Lee et al., 1999) . Misvaluation, either overvalued or undervalued, is measured by the difference between market price and equity book value or fundamental value resulted from RIM.
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The definition of underpayment is based on the theory of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) .
Targets are underpaid if the price is less than target's long-run stand-alone value in cash acquisitions. In stock acquisitions, targets are underpaid if the price is less than targets'
proportionate value of the short-term post-merger combined firm.
To make it more empirically practical, a slightly different measure of underpayment is employed. According to the assumption of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , the misvalued market will return to efficient in the long run. Therefore, the intrinsic value of the target can be measured using the long run market to book ratio. In cash acquisitions, underpayment is the difference between offer price and long-run stand-alone value of the target. In stock acquisitions, underpayment is measured by the difference between original target shareholders' value in the combined firm and the stand-alone value in the long run. Here three-year term is used for the long-run base.
Since target's stand alone market performance can hardly be traced once merged, target's stand-alone value is measured by the average value of the matching firm without merger announcement. The definition of matching firms is that firms, within the same industry according to Fama-French 38 industry classification, have the same quartile of market-to-book ratio with the target in the quarter prior to the announcement date.
In cash acquisitions, it is straight forward that the price offered by acquirers is the real value the targets can get, therefore, underpayment is measured by
where P is offering price per unit of capital, q is the average price per unit of capital of target's matching firms three years after the acquisition, K is target book equity.
In stock acquisitions, however, acquirers pay targets using their overvalued stocks, the offered price is even more misleading especially when the target stocks are undervalued, therefore, the offer price should be adjusted to reflect the real value,
where P is offering price per unit of capital, q1 is the average price per unit of capital of combined firm three years after merger completion, Q1 is the market price per unit of capital of acquirers at the end of quarter prior the announcement. Still, q is the average price per unit of capital of target's matching firms three years after the acquisition, K is target book equity.
If the value of the equation is less than 0, then the target is underpaid, the more negative the value is, the more underpayment of the target. Otherwise, the target is overpaid.
Proxies for Shareholder Horizon
Shareholder daily turnover ratio is used to proxy for shareholder horizon. Turnover is measured as daily trading volume divided by total shares outstanding, multiplying 1000.
It is commonly stated that the larger the turnover ratio is, the shorter horizon shareholders hold in the firms (e.g. Ang and Cheng (2005) , Gaspar et al. (2005) ).
Turnover may contain too much information in addition to shareholder horizon. For example, firms with larger analyst coverage will have a relatively more active trading pattern. Firms with different size are more likely to attract different groups of investors.
To subtract the noise information from turnover, we use the residual mean of target firms' turnover ratio after the regression on logarithm of market value of equity, ji ji ji ME Lg Turnover
where is the turnover ratio of firm j on i days before the announcement, is the logarithm form of market value of firm j on i days before the announcement. The shareholder horizon variable mreone for firm j is constructed as 
where ji ε is the residual of the regression (3), the period for the mean of residual is chosen as one year before one month prior the announcement of the mergers and acquisitions. We choose the period starting from one month prior the announcement to exclude the abnormal volatility and trading since the rumors of mergers and acquisitions of firms usually occur before the official announcement.
Proxies for CEO Horizon
Age: This study employs two methods to proxy age for CEO horizon. In addition, to study the specific impact of different age on CEO horizon in the firm, we also use several dummy variables to separate age to different groups. Equity-based wealth: CEOs' equity-based wealth in their firms include value of stock holding, restricted grants money value, in the money unexercised exercisable option dollar value and in the money unexercised unexercisable option dollar value. The wealth is held and valued at the end of last fiscal year prior the announcement of the mergers and acquisitions. Generally, the equity-based wealth, used as a forward-looking compensation contract, will lead CEOs to have a longer horizon.
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To pair different horizons of CEOs in the acquirer and target, we construct a variable welredif to measure the difference of horizons between acquirer and target CEOs.
Welredif is the difference of residuals of CEO equity-based wealth after regression wealth 3 Cheng (2001) uses the age of 63 to distinguish different horizons held by CEO. Survey by Murphy (1999) shows that the typical age of retirement is 64 around. Therefore the age of 64 can also be used as a flag to differentiate horizon. 4 Lambert and Larcker (1991) suggest that contract tying managers' compensation to firm's market performance can partly solve the problem of managerial myopia.
on size of acquirers and targets. The larger the welredif, the acquirer CEO horizon is longer than target CEO.
Incentive to cash out: CEOs trapped in the firm by a large holding of restricted stocks have strong incentive to cash out. Since restrictions on stocks and options are usually exempted upon a deal of merger and acquisition (Moeller, 2005) , we use the ratio of restricted stock grants value over total equity-based wealth or market value to measure the incentive to cash out. It is expected that CEOs with larger ratio will have shorter horizons in their firms.
Control Variables
Several other variables that may affect the transaction are controlled in the tests.
Targets firm size and the relative size to acquirers will affect the deal value.
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To control the industry factor, we include a dummy variable to indicate whether the merger and acquisition is undertaken by firms in the same industry. The impact of diversification is ambiguous. It is possible that acquirers will pay higher price to targets because they lack perfect information and knowledge to value targets. However, we can also expect that the level of misvaluation is different among industries. Diversified acquisition occurs between more overvalued industry as acquirer and relatively undervalued industry as target. Targets are actually receiving lower price and therefore more likely to be underpaid.
Prior literature addresses that firms with higher valuation are associated with greater use of stock as a method of payment (Dong et al., 2003) . We add an indicator variable of stock to control the impact of method of payment.
Finally, we also include several market return indicators to control the influence of broad market environment.
Sample Selection
The samples are selected from the mergers and acquisitions database of Securities Data In the sample, 58% of all target firms are underpaid by an average value of 529.41 million dollars. Under the assumption of Shleifer and Vishny (2003) , the motivation for rational acquirer managers to undertake mergers and acquisitions in the misvalued stock market is to arbitrage by underpaying targets. Therefore, it is expected that empirically most firms should be underpaid. Result of binomial test shows that percentage of underpayment is larger than 0.5 at the significance level less than 0.001.
Descriptive Statistics
Prior literature has stated a greater use of stock as a method of payment in the 1990s merger wave (e.g., Dong et al. (2003) and Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001) Finally, table 1 shows that most of the observations in our sample ended with complete.
Although we include both completed and withdrawn transactions, only 7% of the sample firms are withdrawn acquisitions.
<Insert Table 1 here> Further study is focused on firm characteristics related to firm horizon. Table 2 summarizes Table 2 shows that CEOs' stock ownership percentage is lower for targets and higher for acquirers in the group of Underpayment than Overpayment. The difference for acquirers is significant at 5% level.
Statistics on age and tenure reported in Panel A and B shows involvement of CEOs with older age and longer tenure in the overpayment. Since age and tenure are expected to have nonlinear relation with CEO horizon, the implication of group mean difference is unclear.
To control the firm size effect and impact of acquirer CEO horizon on target decision, Panel C describes the relative size, age difference and the variable welredif, which is the difference of residuals after regressing CEOs' equity-based wealth on firm size between acquirers and targets. Welredif is constructed to measure difference of CEO horizons between acquirers and targets. As a result, welredif is positive in Underpayment and negative in Overpayment, with significant difference between two groups. The result indicates that targets will accept underpaid offer when their CEOs have relatively shorter horizon than those of acquirers. However, when targets' CEOs have longer horizon than those of acquirers, they will strive for a higher price even resulting in acquirers' overpayment. <Insert Table 2 here> In Table 2 , the shareholder horizon variable mreone is significantly higher in targets underpaid then overpaid, which means that shareholders in underpaid firms have shorter horizon. This is consistent with the hypothesis. Table 3 presents a further study on mreone of targets in different classifications. Panel A categorizes all targets into four groups based on the status and whether they are underpaid or overpaid. Shareholder horizon is reasonably expected to affect final status of the transaction. Generally, if an investor has long horizon in the firm and intends to hold onto shares in a long-term period, he will be less likely to accept a merger offer. Taking underpayment and overpayment into consideration, long-horizon oriented shareholders of targets will benefit either by rejecting an underpaid offer or accepting an overpaid offer.
Shareholders are expected short-horizon oriented to accept an underpaid offer, with an intention to profit from short-term stock price boost around the announcement. Targets overpaid and with status of completed and targets which are underpaid but withdraw from the deal have relatively lower group mean of mreone than the other two groups. Group mean of targets which withdraw from an overpaid deal is in between.
However, F-statistics for mean difference among the four groups is not significant.
Since the major difference is between Group 1 with underpaid and completed targets and other groups, Panel B and Panel C report T-test statistics of the difference between Group 1 and other two groups. It shows that shareholders in targets which competed underpaid deals have shorter horizon than those in targets which competed overpaid deals and which withdraw from underpaid deals, both significant at less than 5% level.
<Insert Table 3 here> Shareholder horizon variable mreone in Table 2 and Table 3 
where variable up equals 1 if underpayment is less than 0, which denotes that targets are underpaid. UP equals 0 if underpayment is larger than or equal to 0, which denotes that targets are overpaid. is the variable measuring target shareholder horizon of firm i, proxied by mreone. is a group of control variables including relative size of targets to acquirers, diversification, target equity value, method of payment and the market environment before announcement. In Model Ⅰ, the coefficient of mreone is significantly positive, which indicates that the higher the shareholder turnover, i.e. the shorter the shareholder horizon, the more likely the target is underpaid. In regard of control variables, it shows that targets are more likely to be underpaid when acquirers are in different industries. It confirms previous prediction that diversified acquisitions occur between more overvalued industry as acquirer and relatively undervalued industry as target. I use logarithm of equity value of target to control target firm size effect and find significant positive relation with the likelihood of underpayment. This is consistent with Schwert (2000) and Gaspar et al. (2005) <Insert Table 4 here>
Target CEO horizon and Underpayment
CEO horizon and Probability of Underpayment
To study the relation between CEO horizon and probability of underpayment, similar logistic regression as model (6) is employed:
where dependent variable is the probability of underpayment, denoted by the dummy when CEOs are too old, they may concern more about their current financial gains instead of future careers and long-term interests in the firms.
Model Ⅲ of Table 5 examines tenure as proxy for CEO horizon for the probability of 8 Murphy (1999) shows that the typical age for CEOs retirement is 64 around.
target underpayment. It shows that CEOs with tenure between 3 and 5 years have significantly higher chance of accepting underpaid offers. This is consistent with the survey of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) . Since CEOs with tenure between 3 and 5 years are most likely to step down, their career concern is lower. Therefore, they may care more about current financial gains. CEOs with tenure shorter than 3 years usually lack strong control of firm decisions. In addition, they are less likely to agree with the deal for their own career concern 9 , which forces acquirers to provide a higher offer price. On the other hand, CEOs that stay in the top position for a very long period either have large stake of interests in the firm or strong control for career security. Both the large amount of equity-based wealth and the career concern lead CEOs to make long-horizon oriented decisions for their firms.
Last column in Table 5 employs both age and tenure variable to measure CEO horizon.
The results of Model Ⅳ are similar to those of models that only include either age or tenure. Regression results on control variables are consistent across all the models in Table 6 and also consistent with the logistic regression of shareholder horizons.
<Insert Table 5 here>   Table 6 adds several CEO compensation variables in the logistic regression models. It is expected that the larger CEOs' equity-based wealth in the firms, the less likely they will have their firms underpaid in mergers and acquisitions. However, when CEOs hold a large percentage of restricted stock grants, they will have strong incentives to cash out and therefore less reluctant to agree an underpaid offer. Model Ⅰ in Table 6 adds logarithm of target CEO wealth and ratio of restricted stock grants over target size. The negative coefficient of target CEO wealth and positive coefficient of restricted ratio 9 According to the survey of Gibbons and Murphy (1992) , it is reasonable to expect that CEOs with shorter tenure than typical retiring tenure have longer period left to stay in their position. However, once the firms are acquired, most of target CEOs can not maintain their position in the combined firms. Hartzell et al. (2004) finds that target CEOs experience high turnover rates both at the announcement of and years after the acquisitions.
proves the expectation, even though the coefficients are not statistically significant.
In the negotiation process of merger and acquisition, both the horizons of target and acquirer CEOs will have impact on the bid price. Long-horizon oriented acquirers and short-horizon oriented targets are more likely to involve in a transaction underpaying targets. To control the impact of acquirer CEOs' horizon, Model Ⅱ employs two variables.
Welredif in Model Ⅱ is the difference between residuals of CEO equity-based wealth after regressing on firm size of acquirers and targets. Larger welredif indicates that acquirer CEO has longer horizon than target CEO. As shown in Model Ⅱ, the coefficient of welredif is significantly positive, which means that the longer of acquirer CEO horizon than target CEO, the more likely targets are underpaid. Model Ⅲ includes both target CEO equity-based wealth and acquirer CEO equity-based wealth. It presents that larger acquirer CEO's wealth and smaller target CEO's wealth will increase the probability of underpayment.
The potential problem of using market value of CEO equity-based wealth is the bias of misvalution. Under the market driven acquisition, targets tend to be relatively undervalued while acquirers tend to be overvalued. Therefore, CEO value of equity-based wealth in the firm based on market price will also be affected. To control the impact of market misvalution on CEO wealth measurement, Model Ⅳ of Table 6 uses ratio of wealth to firm size. Variable weltosize is ratio of target CEO equity-based wealth over target firm size at the end of fiscal year prior the announcement. After dividing wealth by firm size, market value does not impact the measurement of CEO wealth, only the relative stake in the firm matters.
The incentive to cash out is proxied by variable of tgresratio, which is measured by restricted stock grants over target size. Guay (1999) with weltosize, the coefficients should be multiplied by 100. Therefore, the total impact coefficient in the logistic regression for shownpc is (-0.0695*100+6.2937), which is negatively related to the probability of underpayment. Controlling shares ownership of CEO, the coefficient for other equity-based wealth including restricted stock grants and stocks underlying both exercisable and unexercisable options over total shares outstanding is positive. It shows that CEOs with larger stock ownership are less likely to undersell their firms, however, CEOs will be more likely to agree with underpaid deals when they have large stake in other equity-based wealth. The results in Model Ⅳ denotes that stock ownership can align the interests of shareholders and CEOs and lead
CEOs to make long-term oriented decisions. However, the increasing use of stock options and restricted stock grants has the opposite effect, which lends CEOs incentive to cash out and therefore makes them more short-horizon oriented.
Variables on CEO age, tenure and control variables present almost same effect in the logistic regression model as in Table 5 .
<Insert Table 6 here> 
CEO horizon and Level of Underpayment
Same as for shareholder horizon, two regression models are employed to examine the relation between CEO horizon and the level of underpayment. Panel A. in Table 7 uses OLS regression to examine the relation between CEO horizon and the magnitude of underpayment based on: Results of control variables show that relative size of targets to acquirers and target size will significantly increase the level of underpayment. In addition, targets involved in diversified transactions, paid by stock and in relatively bearish market are more underpaid.
Panel B. in Table 7 reports regression results of generalized linear model (GLM).
Dependent variable F(underpay) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
underpay. Target CEO ratio of restricted stock grants in Model Ⅲ and Ⅳ presents expected sign. CEOs with larger ratio of restricted stock grants will make their firms more underpaid. Variables on CEO wealth in both targets and acquirers present that larger acquirer CEO's wealth and smaller target CEO's wealth will result in a more underpaid deal for targets. The larger the difference between acquirer and target CEO's wealth, the more the targets are underpaid.
Model Ⅴ employs two variables weltosize and shownpc, same as Model Ⅳ in Table   6 . The negative coefficient for weltosize is mainly driven by the impact of stock options and restricted stock grants, since the coefficient for stock ownership is positive.
<Insert Table 7 the impact of tenure on CEO decision horizons is not driven by compensation structure.
The major determinant for CEOs' decision horizons in different tenure groups is their career concern.
<Insert Table 8 here>
Target horizon and Underpayment
Previous regression models focus either on CEO horizon or on shareholder horizon alone. Table 9 
Dependent variable F(underpay) is the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of
underpay.
Shareholder horizon variable mreone presents expected sign in all the models. However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant. Statistical results on CEO horizon variables in Table 9 are quite similar to those in Table 6 and Table 7 that only include CEO horizon variables. It posits that the relation between target horizon and underpayment is mainly determined by CEO horizons.
<Insert Table 9 here>
Conclusion
This study examines the hypotheses inspired from Shleifer and Vishny (2003) . Using a sample of 770 mergers and acquisitions announced between 1993 and 2002, I find that the number of targets underpaid in the deals is significantly larger than the number of targets overpaid.
Target shareholder horizon, denoted by mean of daily turnovers over one year period before the month of announcement after controlling firm size effect, has negative relation with probability of underpayment.
CEO horizon is measured by age, tenure in that position, equity-based wealth in the firm, and incentives to cash out. It is found that CEOs have short horizon when they are either younger than 65 or older than 70, or when their tenure is between 3 to 5 years.
Equity-based wealth can align the interests of shareholders and CEOs and reduce the probability of underpayment. However, the overuse of restricted stock grants will induce CEOs to seek cashing out opportunities and agree with an underpaid offer.
This study mainly focuses on target side horizon. It is based on the assumption that mergers and acquisitions are a form of arbitrage by rational acquirers' managers. Since the benefit of acquirers for the transaction is in long-term, it is reasonable to expect that acquirers' horizon also plays an important role in the deal negotiation. Here I only employ acquirer CEOs' equity-based wealth to denote acquirer horizon. Further study can be done where m is the number of underpaid targets on i days before the announcement, n is the number of overpaid targets on i days before the announcement. In figure 1 , the MEAN on Y-axis measures the value of mreup and mreop. LOS on X-axis is the number of days before announcement. where m is the number of targets with completed status on i days before the announcement, n is the number of targets with withdrawn status on i days before the announcement. In figure 2 , the MEAN on Y-axis measures the value of mrecom and mreuncom. LOS on X-axis is the number of days before announcement. Table 1 Table 2 Firm Characteristics classified by Underpayment
In table 2 Table 8 reports the correlation between CEO characteristic variables and the mean and median in different tenure groups. Age is the CEO age at the year of mergers and acquisitions announcement. Tenure is the number of years CEO has stayed in the position till announcement. Exec_dir is the dummy variable to denote whether CEO is also director in the board. CEO_block is the dummy variable to denote whether CEO is a blockholder. Blockholder is defined as shareholder holding no less than 5% shares of total shares outstanding. Shownpc is percentage of common shares held by target CEO. Incent is measured by (value of restricted stock grants + value of in the money unexercised unexercisable options )/ wealth. Tgresratio is measured by target CEO's value of restricted stock grants over target size. Weltosize is ratio of target CEO equity-based wealth over target firm size at the end of fiscal year prior the announcement. Logtgwel is logarithm form of CEO wealth in targets. Logtcc is the logarithm form of target CEO total current compensation. 
